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TECHNOLOGICAL “DISRUPTION” OF THE LAW’S
IMAGINED SCENE: SOME LESSONS FROM L EX

I NFORMATICA
Margot E. Kaminski †

ABSTRACT:
Joel Reidenberg in his 1998 Article Lex Informatica observed that technology can be a
distinct regulatory force in its own right and claimed that law would arise in response to human
needs. Today, law and technology scholarship continues to ask: does technology ever disrupt
the law? This Article articulates one particular kind of “legal disruption”: how technology (or
really, the social use of technology) can alter the imagined setting around which policy
conversations take place—what Jack Balkin and Reva Siegal call the “imagined regulatory
scene.” Sociotechnical change can alter the imagined regulatory scene’s architecture, upsetting
a policy balance and undermining a particular regulation or regime’s goals. That is,
sociotechnical change sometimes disturbs the imagined paradigmatic scenario not by
departing from it entirely but by constraining, enabling, or mediating actors’ behavior that we
want the law to constrain or protect. This Article identifies and traces this now common move
in recent law and technology literature, drawing on Reidenberg’s influential and prescient
work.
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INTRODUCTION

In 1996, as the keynote at an early cyberlaw conference, Judge Frank
Easterbrook famously characterized internet law as “the law of the horse.” 1
Throwing down the gauntlet for generations of technology lawyers and
professors to come, Judge Easterbrook explained that what was then known
as cyberlaw was, like most studies of objects or actors affected by the law, a
collection of questions from disparate areas of legal practice. “Any effort to
collect these strands” into a law school class—or, by implication, a discipline—
“is doomed to be shallow and to miss unifying principles.” 2
He was wrong.
In 1998, Joel Reidenberg provided a set of unifying principles and practices
for technology law. 3 Many of those principles still hold true today. Although
its borders may have changed and its corpus(es) of substantive law expanded,
technology law as a discipline is very much alive and thriving.
This Article begins by charting the core lessons of Lex Informatica: the
unifying principles of technology law. As Reidenberg observed in 1998,
technology can itself be a distinct regulatory force, crafted by extra-legal
players in extra-legal institutions. Designing law for technology requires
understanding and engaging with extra-legal forces, players, and institutions.
Writing at a time when frontier metaphors infused a lot of the early
scholarship, 4 Reidenberg claimed instead that law would be not evadable but
inevitable, arising as the natural consequence of human social practices and
needs. 5
1. Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207,
208 (1996).
2. Id. at 207.
3. Joel R. Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 (1997).
4. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, (Feb. 8, 1996),
https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence; David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and
Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996).
5. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 553–54 (comparing the necessary evolution of
technology law to the evolution of Lex Mercatoria and calling for “ground rules” to “offer
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This Article next turns to recent dialogue from the field of law and
technology, which is now decidedly less existential in nature. Rather than trying
to justify its own existence, recent law-and-technology scholarship focuses on
identifying what makes a particular question interesting, versus the practice of
law as usual. 6 In other words, it asks: does technology ever disrupt the law? 7
And if so, when and how?
stability and predictability so that participants have enough confidence for their communities
to thrive, just as settled trading rules gave confidence and vitality to merchant communities”).
6. See infra note 7.
7. Even framing the question this way is controversial as disruption implies a one-way
arrow of influence of law on technology. Also, when we refer to “technology,” we rarely mean
an object and almost always mean social adoption and uses of technology. The recent and
ongoing debate about technological exceptionalism and technological determinism in the field
asks whether a particular technology has special qualities that make it disruptive to the law or
whether there are other ways to characterize “disruption.” See, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and the
Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513, 515 (2015) (“Robotics is shaping up to be the next
transformative technology of our time. And robotics has a different set of essential qualities
than the Internet. . . . The essential qualities of robotics will drive a distinct conversation
[about the law].”); Jack M. Balkin, The Path of Robotics Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV. CIR. 45, 45 (2015)
(“I do not think it is helpful to speak in terms of ‘essential qualities’ of a new technology that
we can then apply to law. On the contrary, we should try not to think about characteristics of
technology as if these features were independent of how people use technology in their lives
and in their social relations with others. Because the use of technology in social life evolves,
and because people continually find new ways to employ technology for good or for ill, it may
be unhelpful to freeze certain features of use at a particular moment and label them
‘essential.’ ”); Meg Leta Jones, Does Technology Drive Law? The Dilemma of Technological
Exceptionalism in Cyberlaw, 2018 U. ILL. J. L. TECH & POL’Y 249, 253 (“I argue that technology
does not drive law either. Technology is not the locus of legal agency. When testing the theory
of technological exceptionalism, no technology has even been exceptional. We must figure out
a new way to answer the question, ‘are driverless cars new?’ Because, [sic] technological
exceptionalism is not up to the task. Instead of analyzing whether technologies are or will be
exceptional and in addition to analyzing how the law can and should respond to exceptional
or conservative technological advances, this Article argues that cyberlaw research should
consider the way in which technologies, practices, and social arrangements are constructed
within certain legal contexts: the legal construction of technology.”); Margot E. Kaminski,
Legal Disruption: How Technology Disrupts the Law (Mar. 17, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter Legal Disruption]; Margot E. Kaminski, Authorship,
Disrupted: AI Authors in Copyright and First Amendment Law, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 589, 590–91
(2017) [hereinafter Authorship, Disrupted] (“To the extent new technology (or really, the social
practice of a new technology) disrupts the law, it does so because of how it encounters existing
features of the law, both doctrinal and theoretical. The law, in constructing—that is, building
the meaning of—new technological developments and their social uses, takes a central part in
its own disruption. Conceiving of technology as some outside force that acts upon the law can
lead to a technology-centric approach in which one tries to identify what features of a
particular technology are legally disruptive. This kind of disruption narrative gets it wrong. A
particular feature of a particular technology disrupts the law only because the law has been
structured—doctrinally and theoretically—in a way that makes that feature relevant. The
disruptive effects (if any) of a technology become manifest when they encounter, interface
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This Article is part of a larger project, one piece in a puzzle that will
probably take decades to assemble. 8 The Article focuses on one particular
version of what I have called “legal disruption”: how technology, or really the
social use of technology, can change the law’s “imagined regulatory scene.” 9
That is, each law or policy conversation takes place around an understood
imagined setting, with technology, or the lack thereof, often playing a central
role. When the social adoption of technology alters the forces in one of these
imagined scenes, it can upset the policy balance and undermine the goals of a
particular regulation or regime.
Although scholars and policymakers regularly discuss this form of
“disruption,” few have identified it as a particular class of analytical move,
identified its prevalence in the literature, or discussed that move’s implications
and consequences. This Article draws on the lessons of Lex Informatica to
provide guidance for identifying and addressing technological “disruption” of
the law’s imagined scenes—the paradigmatic cases that judges and regulators
use to evaluate and interpret the law.
II.

UNIFYING PRINCIPLES FOR LAW AND TECHNOLOGY:
THE INSIGHTS OF LEX INFORMATICA

Reidenberg’s core insight in Lex Informatica is that the law is not the only
source of rules or rulemaking. 10 Technological architecture is its own distinct
regulatory force. 11 This insight has serious implications for the law. It means
with, and are given particular meaning within the law.”); Rebecca Crootof & BJ Ard, Structuring
Techlaw, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 348, 348–49 (2021) (“The conventional approach is to tackle
these quandaries by identifying something about a technology or its use that is ‘exceptional’
and argue that this distinction necessitates new law or even a new legal regime; or, alternatively,
that a lack of exceptional characteristics implies that the technology can be adequately
governed by extant rules. But while these focused studies are individually useful, the
exceptionalist approach fosters siloed and potentially incomplete analyses, masks the repetitive
nature of the underlying questions, and thereby results in the regular reinvention of the
regulatory wheel.”).
8. See, e.g., Legal Disruption, supra note 7; Authorship, Disrupted, supra note 7.
9. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 927, 928 (2006) (“[L]egal principles are intelligible and normatively authoritative only
insofar as they presuppose a set of background understandings about the paradigmatic cases,
practices, and areas of social life to which they properly apply. A principle always comes with
an imagined regulatory scene that makes the meaning of the principle coherent to us. When
that background understanding is disturbed the principle becomes ‘unstuck’ from its
hermeneutic moorings; it no longer seems clear how the principle applies or even whether it
should apply.”).
10. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 554 (“Technological capabilities and system design
choices impose rules on participants.”).
11. Id. at 555 (describing “technological constraints as a distinct source of rules”).
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that there are alternate sources and sites of “rulemaking” that impact
technology users as much as, and often more so than, the law. It also means
that technology isn’t understood to be value-neutral, authoritative, or
inevitable. It reflects choices. It’s political. 12
Take, for example, internet browsers. Unlike a physical book or magazine,
browsers are configured to record a user’s web browsing patterns. 13 This sets
a default rule that personal data will be collected—a default that can be
overridden only if the technology is designed to allow for it. 14 As we have seen
in the twenty-plus years since Reidenberg published his article, information
collection and use have had significant policy consequences, from contributing
to digital market manipulation to affecting democratic self-governance at its
core. 15
Reidenberg was the first to say that architecture mattered. 16 Technology is
policy. And architectural policy choices are made usually not by lawmakers but
by technologists. 17 Policies are baked into technologies, establishing defaults.
Sometimes those defaults are immutable, and sometimes they allow for
customization or user choice. Rather than being enforced by the courts, this
Lex Informatica often enforces automatically—with all the benefits and
problems “perfect” enforcement entails. 18
12. See Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics?, 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980) (famously
discussing the ways in which objects can be characterized as embodying political choices).
13. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 571.
14. Id. (“[C]ustomizations through reconfigurations are only possible if the architectural
standards support the deviations.”).
15. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008); NEIL M.
RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN THE DIGITAL AGE
(2015); Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy is For, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1904 (2013); Ryan Calo, Digital
Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995 (2014).
16. Reidenberg was followed by Lawrence Lessig in his famous Code and his pathetic
(regulated) dot theory. Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113
HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999) [hereinafter The Law of the Horse]; Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago
School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661, 662 (1998); LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0 (2006)
[hereinafter LESSIG, CODE].
17. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 569.
18. Id. at 569, 576 (discussing PICS-based content filtering as “self-executing” law); see
also Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV.
655, 716 (2006) (“[D]o we really want a structured society? Are the liberty costs too great?
Breaking down the liberty arguments, we see that they largely counsel caution. . . . Structure
can infringe on privacy and raise the specter of a police state . . . with Type I structures, which
force compliance through surveillance and the constant threat of enforcement. . . . Type II
structures may raise accountability concerns because they regulate behavior behind the
scenes.”); Harry Surden, Structural Rights in Privacy, 60 SMU L. REV. 1605, 1616 (2007) (“One
could thus imagine an explicit technological rule built into an automobile’s computer system
which limited the maximum speed of the vehicle to a particular value—say 100 miles per hour.
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Yet Reidenberg was not a tech determinist. 19 He did not subscribe to the
view that technology was ungovernable or that the influence of technology on
law flowed only one way. Information technology was, to him, resolutely not
some mythological ungovernable frontier. Reidenberg didn’t just trust the
market. He had faith in good lawmaking, good institutions, and good law.
Lex Informatica affirmatively calls for law to engage directly with
technological design. Comparing the new rules of information flows to the
norms and customs of sea merchants during the Middle Ages, Reidenberg
charts a progressive view that repeated practices naturally become customs,
which become agreements, which become law. 20 That is, there is a certain
inevitability to law, per Reidenberg. The internet isn’t a no-lawyer’s land; it’s
populated by people who need stability, norms, rules, and consequences.
People need the law and grow the law; it isn’t imposed upon them. 21 This was
not a popular or common view in late 1990s cyber scholarship. 22
Reidenberg was also a pioneer in talking about the importance of law in
fostering consumer trust. It has since become common to talk about
technology and trust. 23 Nobody wants to get into a driverless car if they know
In the presence of such a structural constraint, and assuming the inability to circumvent the
limitation, the speeding behavior could thus be prevented ex-ante, rather than incrementally
deterred. In this scenario, the structural constraint is not only self-enforcing—the constraint
itself has the ability to detect and prevent violations—it is non-violable.”); Christina Mulligan,
Perfect Enforcement of Law: When to Limit and When to Use Technology, 14 RICH. J. L. & TECH. 1, 3
(2008) (“When considering whether to use technology to enforce law, a decision-maker should
make four determinations. First, is the aversion to using the technology an aversion to the
method of enforcing the law or a disagreement with the underlying substantive law? Second,
will the technology effectively enforce the law? Third, is the use of the technology
constitutional? And finally, does the technology trigger any other philosophical concerns?”);
James Grimmelmann, Regulation by Software, 114 YALE L.J. 1719, 1739 (2005) (“Scholarship on
regulatory modalities has convincingly demonstrated that it is often good social policy,
rational, and efficient for people to act with indifference to legal rules. Law, extended into
such realms, disrupts efficient social norms in those cases in which it is applied. Because
software can reach so many more transactions than can law, it can disrupt more cases. And
because software, unlike law, is immediate, the effects of each disruption are more severe.”).
19. For a discussion of technology determinism, see Jones, supra note 7.
20. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 553 (“Custom and practices evolved into a distinct body
of law known as the ‘Lex Mercatoria,’ which was independent of local sovereign rules and
assured commercial participants of basic fairness in their relationships.”).
21. Id. at 554 (“Principles governing the treatment of digital information must offer
stability and predictability so that participants have enough confidence for their communities
to thrive, just as settled trading rules gave confidence and vitality to merchant communities.”).
22. See, e.g., supra note 4.
23. See, e.g., Ian Kerr, Personal Relationships in the Year 2000: Me and My ISP, in
RELATIONSHIPS OF DEPENDENCE AND INTERDEPENDENCE IN LAW 78, 110–11 (2002);
Helen Nissenbaum, Securing Trust Online: Wisdom or Oxymoron?, 81 B.U. L. REV. 635 (2001); Ian
R. Kerr, The Legal Relationship Between Online Service Providers and Users, 35 CAN. BUS. L.J. 419
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driverless cars regularly crash. Users need rules and legal duties so that they
can trust in the safety and security of the technologies they use. Back in the
mid-1990s, however, it was more common in the United States to call for a
wait-and-see approach to technologically enabled harms. 24 Reidenberg breaks
this trend by calling proactively for “common ground rules to create trust and
confidence.” 25
Reidenberg emphasizes that technology can be both the problem and at
least part of the solution. Once we acknowledge and identify a technology’s
politics, Reidenberg explains, we can also use them to align practices with
norms and the law. 26 For example, privacy-enhancing technologies (PETs)
such as cryptography can allow users to make privacy-preserving choices. 27
Technical standards and filtering software can be used (albeit, often
problematically) to screen for copyrighted or illegal content. 28 Reidenberg’s
observations back in 1998 prefigure what is now a central element of privacy
policymaking: a focus on system defaults and “Privacy by Design.” 29 They also
prefigure a growing literature on automated enforcement in copyright law. 30
Other themes of Lex Informatica still reverberate, especially the question of
what to do about significant divergence in national policies. Reidenberg writes
(2001); DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON 103 (2004) (proposing that companies
which collect and utilize user personal information be treated as legal fiduciaries); Neil
Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
431 (2016); Jack M. Balkin, Lecture, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1183, 1221 (2016); ARI EZRA WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST 61–76 (2018); Jack M.
Balkin, The Fiduciary Model of Privacy, 134 HARV. L. REV. FOR. 11 (2020). For a critique of the
fiduciary model, see Lina M. Khan & David E. Pozen, A Skeptical View of Information Fiduciaries,
133 HARV. L. REV. 497 (2019).
24. See supra note 4.
25. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 554.
26. He calls these “policy technologies.” Id. at 569, 575.
27. See id. at 574 (stating PETs can “facilitate the customized management of information
rights in the face of existing technological default rules”).
28. Id. at 575–76 (describing the PICS technical standard); Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair
Use, 86 U. CHI L. REV 283, 302 (2019) (discussing the problems with relying on filtration
software that often incorrectly flags “fair use” of copyrighted works as illegal).
29. See Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design: The 7 Foundational Principles (“Privacy by Design is
a concept I developed back in the 90’s . . . .”); WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT:
THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES (2018); Ari Ezra Waldman,
Privacy’s Law of Design, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1239 (2019); Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the
European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 at
art. 25 [hereinafter GDPR].
30. See Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copyright
Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473 (2016); Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the
Transformation of Copyright Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499 (2017).
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that because of the global nature of information flows, “transnational human
interactions . . . raise profound conflicts for national and international law,”
particularly in the realm of privacy law. 31 Although in Europe, “comprehensive
legal rights exist and government enforcement plays an important role” in data
protection regulation, in the United States, “legal rights are limited.” 32
Reidenberg went on to write several seminal works on this transatlantic
conflict over privacy law, more than a decade before the European Court of
Justice (CJEU) twice invalidated the U.S.-EU transatlantic data transfer
agreements (the Safe Harbor and its replacement, the Privacy Shield). 33 Today,
transatlantic policy conflicts, both substantive and jurisdictional, remain front
and center in information policy, particularly privacy policy. 34 We are still
debating what to do about divergent norms, rules, laws, and design when
information technology flattens the world. 35 For example, the CJEU’s 2014
“right to be forgotten” opinion, Google Spain, triggered a flurry of recent
scholarship assessing fundamental differences between the U.S. and EU
approaches to striking a balance between privacy and speech. 36
Reidenberg also discusses the so-called “pacing problem,” which remains
a central question for law and technology. The question of how to coevolve
law with technology or what to do when “technological developments outpace
31. See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 556.
32. Id. at 561.
33. Joel R. Reidenberg, Resolving Conflicting International Data Privacy Rules in Cyberspace, 52
STAN. L. REV. 5 (2000); Joel R. Reidenberg, E-Commerce and Trans-Atlantic Privacy, 38 HOUS. L.
REV. 717 (2001).
34. See Paul M. Schwartz & Karl-Nikolaus Peifer, Transatlantic Data Privacy Law,
106 GEO. L.J. 115, 117 (2017); Case C-362/14, Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm’r,
ECLI:EU:C:2015:650, 10–31 (Oct. 6, 2015) [hereinafter Schrems I]; Case C-311/18, Data
Prot. Comm’r v. Facebook Ir. Ltd., ECLI:EU:C:2020:559 (July 16, 2020) [hereinafter Schrems
II]. Case C-131/12, Google Spain SL v. AEPD, ECLI:EU:C:2014:317, 22 (May 13,
2014) [hereinafter Google Spain]; C‑507/17, Google LLC v. CNIL, 2019 EUR-Lex CELEX
No. 62017CJ0507 (Sept. 24, 2019) [hereinafter CNIL].
35. See Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107 NW U. L. REV. 1, 22–25 (2012); Anupam
Chander, Margot E. Kaminski & William McGeveran, Catalyzing Privacy Law, 105 MINN. L.
REV. 1733, 1737–38 (2021).
36. Steven C. Bennett, The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’: Reconciling EU and US Perspectives, 30
BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 161 (2012); Robert Post, Data Privacy and Dignitary Privacy: Google Spain,
the Right to be Forgotten, and the Construction of the Public Sphere, 67 DUKE L.J. 981 (2018); Stefan
Kulk & Frederik Z. Borgesius, Google Spain v. González: Did the Court Forget about Freedom of
Expression?, 5 EURO. J. RISK REG. 389 (2014); see also Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Global Platform
Governance, 72 SMU L. Rev. 27 (2019); Daphne Keller, The Right Tools: Europe’s Intermediary
Liability Laws and the EU 2016 General Data Protection Regulation, 33 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 287
(2018). The CJEU’s subsequent case on extraterritorial enforcement of the right to be
forgotten reflected similar conversations about choice-of-law, jurisdiction, and
extraterritoriality from the mid-to-late 1990s. See CNIL, supra note 34.
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the rate of legal change” still resounds throughout law and technology
scholarship. 37 The pacing problem, where in Reidenberg’s words “today’s
regulations may easily pertain to yesterday’s technologies,” 38 has led to the
development of a robust regulatory toolkit for future-proofing the law. 39 That
toolkit includes, among other things, deploying technology-neutral versus
technology-specific legislation, 40 debating whether to establish new expert
agencies, 41 employing complex forms of hybrid public-private governance; 42
establishing regulatory sandboxing, 43 and using and incorporating extra-legal
standards processes. 44 As Reidenberg wrote back in 1998, many of these
regulatory tools evidence, for better or for worse, 45 “a shift in the focus of
government action away from direct regulation and toward indirect influence”
on technical development while still attempting to “preserve strong attributes
of public oversight.” 46 We still struggle centrally today with how best to

37. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 566.
38. Id. at 586.
39. See, e.g., Legal Disruption, supra note 7; Crootof & Ard, supra note 7; INNOVATIVE
GOVERNANCE MODELS FOR EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES (Gary E. Marchant & Kenneth W.
Abbott eds., 2013).
40. Michael Birnhack, Reverse Engineering Informational Privacy Law, 15 YALE J.L. & TECH.
24, 27 (2012); Paul Ohm, The Argument Against Technology-Neutral Surveillance Laws, 88 TEX. L.
REV. 1685 (2010); Brad A. Greenberg, Rethinking Technology Neutrality, 100 MINN. L. REV. 1495
(2016).
41. Ryan Calo, Report: The case for a federal robotics commission, BROOKINGS (Sept. 15, 2014),
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-case-for-a-federal-robotics-commission/.
42. Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in
Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 346–47 (2004); Margot E. Kaminski, Binary
Governance: Lessons from the GDPR’s Approach to Algorithmic Accountability, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. 1529,
1530 (2019); W. Nicholson Price II, Regulating Black-Box Medicine, 116 MICH. L. REV. 421, 465–
71 (2017); Dennis D. Hirsch, Going Dutch? Collaborative Dutch Privacy Regulation and the Lessons It
Holds for U.S. Privacy Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 83, 151–60; Kenneth A. Bamberger &
Deirdre K. Mulligan, Privacy on the Books and on the Ground, 63 STAN. L. REV. 247, 248 (2011);
William McGeveran, Friending the Privacy Regulators, 58 ARIZ. L. REV. 959, 980 (2016); Lauren
E. Willis, Performance-Based Consumer Law, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1330–35 (2015). For
critiques, see Cohen, supra note 15, at 1915–17; Ari Ezra Waldman, Privacy, Practice, and
Performance, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1, 5–6).
43. Hillary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 579, 580 (2019).
44. See, e.g., Emily Bremer, Incorporation by Reference in an Open-Government Age, 36 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 131, 134 (2013); Irene Kamara, Co-regulation in EU Personal Data Protection:
The Case of Technical Standards and the Privacy by Design Standardisation ‘Mandate,’ 8 EUR. J. L. &
TECH., no. 1 (2017).
45. See Julie E. Cohen, How (Not) to Write a Privacy Law, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT
INST. COLUMBIA UNIV. (Mar. 23, 2021), https://knightcolumbia.org/content/how-not-towrite-a-privacy-law.
46. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 586.
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incorporate expert knowledge and enforcement resources from outside the
formal legal system while tethering such lawmaking to the public good.
III.

“LEGAL DISRUPTION”

As Reidenberg so presciently laid out in 1998, the interplay between law
and technology is complex. Technology can be a regulatory force in its own
right, but it does not just act upon static, passive law (or, for that matter, static,
passive people). 47 Rather, the interaction between law and technology takes
many forms.
Law can structure technological development, for example, by requiring
that technology have certain features (such as seatbelts) or be designed towards
certain policy goals (such as safety). Technology can pose challenges for legal
institutions qua institutions: by falling outside existing institutions’ fields of
specialization or legal mandates; by falling into unclaimed gaps between
institutions or regimes; or by falling into a regulatory thicket of overlapping
regulation. And of course, there is the so-called “pacing problem,” which
usually manifests either as a question of how to get new technical expertise
into the legal system or, more generally, how to design law for change over
time by delegating some decision-making to more temporally proximate or
more expert actors (a variation on the conversation about rules and
standards 48 ). 49 As Reidenberg identified in 1998, regulatory design is a
perennially central issue for law and technology. 50
Sometimes, though, the social adoption of a new technology doesn’t raise
questions of regulatory design, expertise, or pacing. Sometimes, the adoption
and use of technology can make salient existing features of the law. 51 For
47. See, e.g., Jones, supra note 7; Authorship, Disrupted, supra note 7; JULIE E. COHEN,
CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY
PRACTICE 127 (2012) (“[D]eveloping a decentered model of subjectivity organized around
three sets of considerations: the evolution of experienced ‘selfhood’ from the situated subject’s
perspective, the collective dimension of subjectivity, and the play that overlapping social and
cultural networks afford.”).
48. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
568–69 (1992).
49. See Legal Disruption, supra note 7, at 14, 21 (listing ways technology and the law
interact).
50. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 586–87; Legal Disruption, supra note 7, at 36
(calling for a legal toolkit for technological change); Crootof & Ard, supra note 7, at 400.
51. Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression
for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2004) (“If we assume that a technological
development is important to law only if it creates something utterly new, and we can find
analogues in the past—as we always can—we are likely to conclude that because the
development is not new, it changes nothing important. That is the wrong way to think about
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example, the development of participatory online platforms made salient the
fact that much of free speech theory and doctrine had been built around a
broadcast model of media, with one speaker using legacy media platforms to
broadcast to many passive listeners. 52 This shift also made salient that the law
had assumed speech will often be temporary rather than recorded, and limited
to certain contexts rather than context-collapsing. Thus, technological change
can make salient certain features of doctrine (which doctrinal bucket do
internet platforms belong in? 53) and of theory (given the cheapness of speech
production, is the “marketplace of ideas” theory of the First Amendment
outdated? 54).
As I have argued elsewhere, however, “technology is not just a stable lens
through which we see stable aspects of the law. [Technology] takes on a
particular meaning within the law depending on what one thinks the law is or
should be.” 55 That is to say, the law dynamically constructs technology into its
own systems of meaning—just as it constructs many other things. 56 Take the
classic H.L.A. Hart hypothetical “No Vehicles in the Park”: what falls into the
doctrinal bucket of “vehicle”? Do cars? Do nonmotorized boats? Do strollers?
Do unmanned drones? 57
technological change and public policy . . . . Instead of focusing on novelty, we should focus
on salience. What elements of the social world does a new technology make particularly salient
that went relatively unnoticed before? What features of human activity or of the human
condition does a technological change foreground, emphasize, or problematize? And what are
the consequences for human freedom of making this aspect more important, more pervasive,
or more central than it was before?”).
52. Id. at 6.
53. Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Acocuntability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1149 (2008); Eugene Volokh &
Donald M. Falk, Google: First Amendment Protection for Search Engine Search Results, 8 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 883, 884 (2012); Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1495, 1496, 1521–22
(2013); James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 870 (2014).
54. Toni M. Massaro & Helen Norton, Free Speech and Democracy: A Primer for 21st Century
Reformers, 54 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1631, 1634–35 (2021); Julie E. Cohen, Tailoring Election
Regulation: The Platform is the Frame, 4 GEO. TECH. L. REV. 641, 642 (2020); FRANK PASQUALE,
THE AUTOMATED PUBLIC SPHERE 1–4 (2017). The rise of the sociotechnical phenomenon of
online propaganda has led to similar questions about the assumptions behind First
Amendment theory and doctrine. See Tim Wu, Is the First Amendment Obsolete?, 117 MICH. L.
REV. 547, 548 (2018).
55. Authorship, Disrupted, supra, note 7, at 592.
56. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 7, at 253 (“[C]yberlaw research should consider the way
in which technologies, practices and social arrangements are constructed within certain legal
contexts: the legal construction of technology.”).
57. H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607
(1958); see also Pierre Schlag, No Vehicles in the Park: Interpretation as Retrieval, 23 SEATTLE U. L.
REV. 381, 387 (1999); Frederick Schauer, A Critical Guide to Vehicles in the Park, 83 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1109 (2008).
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Sometimes questions of legal construction are just, as Hart tried to argue
about his example, 58 examples of the law operating as usual: applying to techenabled social practices without noticeable hiccups; 59 applying legal definitions
to new facts; 60 establishing “institutional facts”; 61 or situating a fact pattern
into existing doctrinal buckets. And sometimes—as is the case with other
things the law constructs—things aren’t business as usual, and we have to
“bump up a level” to ask why we have a law in the first place. 62 What might
need to change at the level of statute or doctrine in order to accomplish
theoretical goals? What might need to change at the level of theory in order to
accomplish normative goals? As my colleague Pierre Schlag has written, “[w]e
are not just talking about parks and vehicles here; we are talking about parks
and vehicles in a legal rule in a legal system in a particular culture.” 63
All of these questions—of institutional design, regulatory toolkits, salience,
and construction—are ultimately about power. Who has power? How do those
with power use it? How does power accumulate, disperse, get checked? And
given that we are lawyers, after all, how does the structure of the law exacerbate

58. See Schauer, supra note 57, at 1119 (“Hart’s claim, at least in 1958, was that the
statutory language, as language, would generate some number of clear or core
applications . . . .”).
59. PAMELA SAMUELSON, FIVE CHALLENGES FOR REGULATING THE GLOBAL
INFORMATION SOCIETY 4 (2000) (“[T]he general view in the U.S. is that antitrust and
competition law continues to be viable in the digital age, and can successfully be adapted to
deal with software and Internet companies.”).
60. This is what Hart claimed he was doing: merely applying the law—or what Schlag
has called “preserv[ing] the hard core of settled meaning from the effects of reconsideration
in light of social policy.” Schlag, supra note 57, at 387 (observing that Hart’s purportedly
authoritative interpretation was a “legal move” like any other).
61. Thanks to the wonderful late Ian Kerr for pointing me to this concept. My favorite
example of an institutional fact is a trespass-nuisance case in which a Michigan court defined
“dust” as “intangible” for purposes of the law. Adams v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602
N.W.2d 215, 223 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (“We further hold that dust must generally be
considered intangible and thus not actionable in trespass. We realize, of course, that dust
particles are tangible objects in a strict sense that they can be touched and are comprised of
physical elements. However, we agree with those authorities that have recognized, for practical
purposes, that dust, along with other forms of airborne particulate, does not normally present
itself as a significant physical intrusion.”).
62. This resembles Fuller’s response to Hart—you can never just look to the text; you
also have to look to the purpose. See Schauer, supra note 57, at 1114. I discuss this idea of levels
in Authorship, Disrupted, supra note 7, at 615 (“Examining emergent machine authors and their
interface with U.S. law illustrates several ways in which technology can be legally disruptive.
Technology can require minor doctrinal tweaks . . . . Or it can fall between existing legal
categories . . . . Or technology can trigger a reassessment of underlying theories behind the
law, whether lower level theorization . . . or higher level theorization . . . .”).
63. Schlag, supra note 57, at 387.
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or entrench existing power disparities, or alternatively disperse them and hold
power accountable?
IV.

“LEGAL DISRUPTION” AND THE IMAGINED
REGULATORY SCENE

Technology doesn’t drive the law. 64 Like other kinds of social changes,
however, sociotechnical changes can afford new opportunities for
contestation over legal rules and principles. 65 Whether in courts, regulatory
bodies, or legislatures, sociotechnical change often (though not always) creates
a chance to reevaluate and argue about not just the application of the law but
the normative scaffolding undergirding it. Ostensibly, this is why so many of
us remain committed to the study of law and technology.
The second half of this Article now turns to a particular genre of the “legal
disruption” discussion that is by now widely prevalent in the law and
technology literature but goes largely unidentified and unnamed. We can
understand this genre as another example of the “legal construction” of
technology, but it is different from the usual debates over textual interpretation
or regulatory design. It takes place not on the page but in our heads. It is often
the unacknowledged precursor to, or backdrop for, more concrete doctrinal
or regulatory conversations.
A growing number of scholars, in a growing number of subfields, have
noted that technological adoption can change our fundamental assumptions
about the architecture of a regulated environment. Drawing on Jack Balkin and
Reva Siegel’s work, I call this move disruption of the “imagined regulatory
scene.” 66
This move has different implications and consequences than discussing
how to channel expertise, or regulatory design, or the application of doctrinal
buckets—although it may be part of or precursor to any of those
conversations, as well. As with any legal move, knowing that it is an identifiable
move makes a difference in how we understand it. 67
A.

IMAGINED REGULATORY SCENES . . .

Balkin and Siegel identified that every legal principle—by which they mean
“norms of conduct that express values” 68 —is developed with a particular
imagined paradigmatic scenario in mind. That is:
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

Jones, supra note 7, at 253.
Balkin & Siegel, supra note 9, at 928.
Id.
Schlag, supra note 57, at 387–88.
Balkin & Siegel, supra note 9, at 930.
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[L]egal principles are intelligible and normatively authoritative only
insofar as they presuppose a set of background understandings
about the paradigmatic cases, practices, and areas of social life to
which they properly apply. A principle always comes with an imagined
regulatory scene that makes the meaning of the principle coherent to
us. 69

Balkin and Siegel provide several examples. The imagined regulatory scene
behind the First Amendment principle that the government should not
discriminate against speech on the basis of its content is government
censorship of Communist literature or of antiwar protestors. 70 The imagined
regulatory scene behind the anticlassification principle is Jim Crow, particularly
the de jure racial segregation of school children. 71
Perhaps these imagined scenes arise naturally out of the common law
process, which builds principles from the facts of particular cases. Or perhaps
they are endemic to legal reasoning writ large. All words have meaning in
context, whether the facts are imagined or applied.
When new circumstances arise that depart from the imagined paradigm,
whether through changes in social practices or through technological

69. Id. at 928 (emphasis added). The imagined regulatory scene is related but not identical
to the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries” used in Science and Technology Studies (STS).
An imagined regulatory scene, as Balkin and Siegal conceive of it, is the more constrained
landscape in which construction of a particular law, legal principle, or future legislation or
regulation takes place. According to Sheila Jasanoff and Sang-Hyun Kim, sociotechnical
imaginaries are “collectively imagined forms of social life and social order reflected in the
design and fulfillment of nation-specific scientific and/or technological projects.” Sheila
Jasanoff & Sang-Hyun Kim, Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and Nuclear Regulation
in the U.S. and South Korea, 47 MINERVA 119, 120 (2009). First, sociotechnical imaginaries are
often future-oriented in a way an imagined regulatory scene need not be. See Lisa Messeri &
Janet Vertesi, The Greatest Missions Never Flown: Anticipatory Discourse and the “Projectory” in
Technological Communities, 56 TECH. & CULTURE 54, 55–56 (2015) (discussing “shared futureoriented narratives about technoscientific possibilities”). Judges and regulators regularly
construct imagined regulatory scenes using current or past social practices. Second,
sociotechnical imaginaries are quintessentially collectively constructed, on a community or
societal level, where an imagined regulatory scene can be individualized (say, at the level of an
individual author or judge, obviously influenced by societal-level imaginaries but not
necessarily coextensive with them and often in conflict). Third, an imagined regulatory scene
is oriented towards answering specific questions about law or regulation in a way that a
sociotechnical imaginary need not be. That is, some imagined regulatory scenes might also be
sociotechnical imaginaries, but not all; and not all sociotechnical imaginaries are imagined
regulatory scenes. Many thanks to Meg Jones, Julie Cohen, and Ryan Calo for pointing out the
resemblances, and particular thanks to Meg Jones for providing a guide to the literature.
70. Balkin & Siegal, supra note 9, at 931.
71. Id.

KAMINSKI_FINALPROOF_07-20-22 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TECHNOLOGICAL “DISRUPTION”

9/15/2022 9:43 AM

897

development or both, a legal principle may become “unstuck.” 72 Balkin and
Siegel also refer to this as “disturb[ing] the ecology of a principle’s
application.” 73 This creates an opportunity for contestation between actors
and counter-actors, not only at courts, but at any lawmaking venue. 74 Actors
might contest whether to apply a particular principle, how to apply a particular
principle, or whether the principle remains normatively valid at all. 75
Balkin and Siegel focus on what happens when there is a complete shift
from one imagined regulatory scene to another. That is, their focus is on what
happens when we shift, for example, from applying the First Amendment
doctrinal prohibition against content-discrimination to direct government
censorship of disfavored voices, in the first instance, to copyright legislation
instead. This is one flavor of legal disruption: technological development and
use (filesharing) leads to legal change (copyright legislation) which leads to an
entirely different imagined regulatory setting (evaluating the term length of
copyright law) for debating the application of foundational legal principles (the
First Amendment’s protections). 76 Through strategic litigation and advocacy,
social practices that were once invisible to the First Amendment have now
become salient to it—from campaign contributions to computer code to video
recording to consumer disclosures. 77 Balkin and Siegel’s central claim is that
shifts in imagined scenes, sociotechnical or otherwise, often unmoor legal
principles and make them contestable again. 78
B.

. . . AND ARCHITECTURAL DISRUPTION

The move now recurring in the law and technology literature is different
in degree, and perhaps in kind, from the shifts Balkin and Siegel discuss. Rather
than asking, “What happens to this old principle when it’s applied in an entirely
new setting?” the move asks, “What happens to this old principle when the
72. Id. at 928 (“When that background understanding is disturbed the principle becomes
‘unstuck’ from its hermeneutic moorings; it no longer seems clear how the principle applies
or even whether it should apply.”).
73. Id. at 937.
74. Id. at 946.
75. Id. at 943–44.
76. Id. at 945–46. In the First Amendment context, this question runs parallel to
discussions of constitutional salience. See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1765
(2004).
77. Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
713, 716 (2000); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 133, 140 (2016).
78. Balkin & Siegel, supra note 9, at 937 (“[T]echnological change alone did not alter the
meaning of the free speech principle; rather, it provided an incentive and an opportunity for
interested parties to offer new, competing interpretations of the jurisdiction of the free speech
principle.”).
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balance of forces in an imagined scene is thrown off?” That is, it incorporates
the insights of Reidenberg and others about what technological developments
can do to an imagined scene.
This returns us to the core insight of Lex Informatica: that technological
design can be its own regulatory force. Both Reidenberg and Lawrence Lessig
after him understood that technology can be architecture. 79 Other forces such
as laws, market forces, and social norms do matter, but technology is a
regulatory force of its own.
That is, technology can constrain behavior, 80 enable behavior, 81 and
mediate behavior. 82 A website’s design may prevent a user from behaving in
particular ways, such as accessing certain material or viewing particular user
profiles. A website’s design may enable a user to resort to self-help by
deploying privacy-protective technology such as Do Not Track. Or a website’s
design may change the user by mediating her capabilities and choices. 83
The basic point is this: sociotechnical change often alters the imagined
regulatory scene’s architecture. That is, it changes the imagined paradigmatic
scenario not by departing from it entirely, but by constraining, enabling, or
mediating behavior, both by actors we want the law to constrain and actors we
want the law to protect.
These changes often go beyond the purely architectural. By altering the
architecture, sociotechnical change affects social norms, social practices, and
social sanctions that the law often presupposes as part of its imagined
regulatory scene. If we think of policymaking as being about striking a balance
in service of underlying principles, these alterations to the imagined regulatory
scene can throw the existing balance out of whack, even as the law on the
books remains the same.
To make this all more concrete, let us turn to some illustrations and an
example. 84
When Judge Easterbrook spoke about the relationship between
technology and the law, he largely thought of the law as acting upon
technology:

79. The Law of the Horse, supra note 16. LESSIG, CODE, supra note 16.
80. See Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 554–55; LESSIG, CODE, supra note 16.
81. See Reidenberg, supra note 3.
82. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1905–06.
83. See Calo, supra note 15 at 995.
84. I’ve used a variation on this example in talks and in Margot E. Kaminski, Regulating
Real World Surveillance, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1113, 1136 (2015).
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Figure 1: Easterbrook’s Vision

That is, technology is just an object like a horse is an object. The law applies
to it, acts upon it, constrains it, or protects it. That is all.
When Reidenberg spoke about technology, however, his conception of the
imagined regulatory scene was far more complex. Technology can act upon
people just as the law acts upon people. And, importantly, people—and the
law—can also act upon, and through, technology:
Figure 2: Reidenberg’s Vision

The above static graphic is woefully inaccurate in that there is no such
thing as a core, static “person” or “technology” or “law.” These are not just
one-way forces but dynamic, dialectical relationships. 85 Each is constantly
evolving, shaped by and in conversation with the other. And this occurs within

85. COHEN, supra note 47, at 131 (“Experienced selfhood is more accurately described
as evolving subjectivity, formed and re-formed out of productive tensions between intake and
outflow, performance and reflection, contact and separation.”).
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culture, where norms shape these interactions and co-evolve with both legal
and technological change. 86
Now for a more concrete illustration: let’s take the imagined regulatory
scene behind U.S. privacy law’s founding document—Warren and Brandeis’s
The Right to Privacy. 87 Writing in 1890, Warren and Brandeis were concerned
about the rise of “instantaneous photographs” and “newspaper enterprise”—
a particular technology and a particular social practice. 88 In 1890, there were
no privacy torts; that is, there was no applicable law to either constrain
behavior or enable self-help to protect rights. But prior to 1890 (more or less)
there were no easy-to-use cameras and no “yellow journalism” or gossip rags
to buy, circulate, and profit from scandalous pictures.
Thus, the imagined regulatory scene for Warren and Brandeis initially did
not need law to constrain people from recording and circulating private
information in the form of personal photographs. For one, prior to the rise of
yellow journalism, such information didn’t have a market. Without the
motivation or means to circulate private information to the general public,
much circulation of information could be controlled through social sanction—
by, say, socially exiling or shaming the gossip. And—here is technology as
architecture—it would be costly, in terms of not just money but time and skill,
to sit down and draw a particular person or event from memory, compared to
taking a picture. 89
The lack of technology and lack of yellow journalism were, in other words,
features of some imagined regulatory scene, pre-privacy tort. The balance of
forces within that imagined setting achieved a particular policy objective, or
served a particular legal principle, without a need for law. Once both the
technology and accompanying social practices changed, however, Warren and
Brandeis argued that new law was necessary to preserve the policy balance and
achieve the same goals.
Now let’s look at a second, more contemporary example of almost the
same debate. Laws now (somewhat) constrain what people can do with
cameras. 90 People have generally adapted to a world in which ordinary
86. See Jasmine McNealy, An Ecological Approach to Data Governance 20–27 (Feb. 20,
2021) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (describing a micro, meso, and macro
layered approach to understanding big data, with culture permeating throughout).
87. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
88. Id. at 195.
89. You see much of the same conversation about lowering cost and increased accuracyreliability in court cases about audio recording. See Kaminski, supra note 84, at 1152 n.158.
90. See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 1708.8(b) (West 2011) (regulating recording where a
“physical impression could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or
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photography is omnipresent. That is, the norms around the pervasiveness of
photography have certainly changed, but we have also codified acceptable and
unacceptable behavior, including through tools outside of the law, such as
social norms and technological architecture.
Many cameras are visible and audible, providing notice to picture subjects
through shutter sounds or flashes. 91 Often (though definitely not always)
people are able to prevent unwanted photographs from being taken. They can
socially sanction photographers without resorting to the law. People can and
do use the architecture of their lived environments, such as high fences or
walls, to keep photographers out. Or they rely on custom and experience to
assume that there are no cameras in certain environments, even in ostensibly
public spaces. 92 Figure 3 illustrates how this blend of law, technological design,
and social sanction might work to constrain and enable behavior around
photography. Law can regulate the technology; law can regulate the person
who uses the technology; the person whose image is captured can socially
sanction the photographer; and the person whose image is captured can
choose to erect a privacy fence or hide behind physical structures:

auditory enhancing device was used”); Shulman v. Grp. W Prods., Inc., 18 Cal. 4th, 200 (1998);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
91. M. R. Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1027, 1027 n.1 (2013) (“[A] bill was proposed in the United States that would have
required cell phone cameras to make an audible shutter sound. See Camera Predator Alert Act
of 2009, H.R. 414, 111th Cong. (2009).”).
92. Rooftop ‘Newlyweds’ Captured by Accidental Drone Shot, BBC (Oct. 3, 2016), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-37538169.
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Figure 3: Cameras and the Imagined Regulatory Scene

But now cameras can fly. What do drones or unmanned aerial vehicles do
to this imagined regulatory scene? I’ve argued that drones shift the imagined
scene in some pretty profound ways. 93 Drones may still be noisy and visible,
for now but, like hidden cameras, they physically distance the photographer
from the photographed. That is, the photographer or videographer often can’t
be shamed into stopping. Drones, too, change the expected vantage point.
Like helicopters or airplanes, they make existing architectural defenses, such
as fences, immaterial. 94 Finally, drone photography or videography, by virtue
of its cheapness and ease of adoption (compared to learning to fly or chartering
a helicopter), means there is a potential for ubiquitous or pervasive
surveillance, which is different in kind even from most existing aerial
photography by being different in degree.
Drones, then, arguably alter the law’s imagined ecology in a number of
ways. The imagined regulatory scene has not shifted to an entirely new
environment but features of the imagined environment have changed so as to
upset some equilibrium in service of some underlying principle.

93. See Kaminski, supra note 84, at 1162.
94. See Surden, supra note 18, at 1606 n.3 (“A fence is an example of a structural regulator.
Rather than relying upon trespass law to keep unwanted visitors from one’s land, landowners
often rely on the physical regulation that a tall fence imposes.”).
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To summarize: technology can alter the imagined regulatory scene. It does
so not just by serving as a distinct regulatory force but by upsetting some
“balance” of forces within the imagined scene that serves a legal principle. The
upset of balance can threaten a legal principle or cause us to reexamine it. Legal
responses to these changes, including no response, can shift who has power
or can entrench existing power disparities.
C.

IMPLICATIONS

As discussed below, identifying how sociotechnical change alters the
imagined regulatory environment’s architecture, and thus the balance of legal
and normative forces, is an analytical move that now recurs in the legal
literature. I am certainly not the first, and will not be the last, to make it.
Identifying this as a common move in law and technology analysis lets us better
examine its implications.
First, although this move often focuses on constraints on bad actors, it can
also undergird conversations about lost or gained affordances and about
technological mediation. That is, changes to the imagined regulatory scene
affect both constraints on bad actors and the rights and capacities of those we
want the legal system to protect. 95 They also can profoundly affect individual
actors by mediating or channeling their behavior.
Take, for example, the ease with which a file can be distributed online.
Through the lens of copyright or privacy policy, the change to the imagined
scene through the widespread use of this technology lowers constraints on
copyright or privacy violators. 96 Through the lens of the First Amendment,
however, this same change is less about constraints and more about capacities:
speakers can use the same infrastructure to amplify private voices and more
readily become part of public discourse and shared culture.
Technology does not just constrain people. It also provides them tools to
exercise their capabilities. Thus, the observation that sociotechnical change has
affected the architecture of the imagined regulatory scene is often used to argue
for using the law to influence or regulate technological design—for example,

95. While much of Lessig’s work focuses on the latter—on how the various forces of
architecture, norms, market, and the law stop people from doing something bad—Reidenberg’s
work also addresses the former: how architecture not only constrains but affords. See
Reidenberg, supra note 3; see, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Affording Fundamental Rights: A Provocation
Inspired by Mireille Hildebrandt, 4 CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF LAW 78 (2017) (reviewing Hildebrandt’s
SMART TECHNOLOGIES AND THE END(S) OF LAW (2015)).
96. Surden, supra note 18, at 1618 (“Importantly, many emerging technologies possess
exactly this characteristic—the tendency to lower transactional and operational costs. This in
turn permits conduct which was previously costly or impossible.”).
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by reinstating “friction” in online content sharing 97 or by making privacyprotective features the default or readily available for users to choose. 98
Sometimes then, a shift in the imagined regulatory scene leads to arguments
for replacing pretechnological constraints with new law. 99 Sometimes it leads
to calls to “slow down” 100 or “add friction” or otherwise reimpose old
architectural constraints. 101 Sometimes it leads to arguments for replacing lost
architectural constraints with new technological features. 102 Other times, as in
the free speech context, it leads to questions of whether law should celebrate
technology’s affordances or restrict them. 103
More recent literature recognizes that technological architecture also
mediates people. 104 That is to say, technological design channels peoples’
behavior, both in what they do and what they watch, hear, or read. It can, often
deliberately, lead people to act, buy, or choose things they otherwise would not
have done, bought, or chosen—including elected officials. 105 Understanding
the ways in which the imagined regulatory scene of, say, news consumption
has shifted when it takes place online can be helpful for framing discussions
of content moderation and fake news.
The move does not have to be dystopian. It can be applied in more
optimistic ways, imagining how the design and use of technology might make
the imagined regulatory scene better for the actors in it. 106 And although the
97. William McGeveran, The Law of Friction, 2013 U. CHI. LEG. FOR. 15 (2013).
98. Ian Kerr, The Devil is in the Defaults, 4 CRITICAL ANALYSIS L 91 (2017).
99. See Surden, supra note 18 at 1619.
100. Tom C.W. Lin, The New Financial Industry, 65 ALA. L. REV. 567, 603 (2014) (suggesting
“slow[ing] down” as a solution).
101. Paul Ohm & Jonathan Frankle, Desirable Inefficiency, 70 FLA. L. REV. 777, 804 (2018)
(defining “desirable inefficiency” as “fail[ing] to minimize the consumption of time, energy,
or space in satisfying a specification of correctness for a given basic problem in order to
address a different, related enhanced problem.”).
102. See Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV.
385 (2013).
103. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What it Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805 (1995); Wu,
supra note 54; Massaro & Norton, supra note 54.
104. Cohen, supra note 15.
105. See, e.g., Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 13 J.
LEG. ANALYSIS 43 (2021); Lauren E. Willis, Deception By Design, 34 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 115,
143 (2020).
106. See, e.g., Ryan Calo & Danielle Keats Citron, The Automated Administrative State: A
Crisis of Legitimacy, 70 EMORY L.J. 797, 838–39 (2021) (“Although we decry the actual
deployment of automated software systems by agencies to date, we would not deny our
government the technological affordances of the twenty-first century. As a diverse set of
scholars have begun to observe, agencies can and sometimes do bring advances in information
technology constructively to bear on the incredibly complex task of regulation and
governance.”).
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move is often used to argue for more law or extending law, it does not necessarily
push in a particular normative or regulatory direction. Rather, as Balkin and
Siegel note, a shift in the imagined regulatory scene opens up a site of
contestation for arguments to occur. Furthermore, different people may have
different imagined regulatory scenes in mind, such that an argument to return
to or depart from the status quo could point in very different directions.
Counterarguments to making this move include that it is inherently
conservative in nature. The move arguably imagines some pretechnological
halcyon age of perfect policy balance. Arguably, because of this inherent
conservativism, the move can prevent the coevolution of social norms with
the uptick of a new technology’s use.
Countermoves include asking whether existing technology or practices in
fact have already changed the imagined regulatory scene. If the law has not
adapted to cover other similar technologies, then why change it to cover this
particular new technology? This “antidiscrimination” argument, 107 which can
also come in the guise of an argument for technological neutrality, can be used
to push against expanding the law’s coverage or to push for deregulation.
D.

THE MOVE IN THE LITERATURE

There are countless examples of the move in the law and technology
literature. That is, many articles, knowingly or not, identify how sociotechnical
change to the imagined regulatory scene promulgates structural changes and
build policy recommendations accordingly. This Section provides just a few of
them. I identify both articles where the move is explicit and where the move
is implicit in the backdrop. I provide examples that characterize architectural
changes to the imagined scene in a variety of ways: as constraints, as
affordances, and as mediation.
1. Architectural Changes as Constraints
My colleague Harry Surden provides a head-on examination of
architectural changes as affecting constraints in his Essay, Structural Rights in
Privacy. 108 Drawing on Lessig’s work, Surden observes that certain non-legal
regulatory mechanisms “restrict or moderate the level of behavior by
increasing (or reducing) costs of certain activities.” 109 Surden writes of how
structural design can act as “non-legal regulatory devices,” constraining actors
107. For an example of similar arguments in the First Amendment context, see Felix Wu,
An Anti-Discrimination Theory of the First Amendment (May. 1, 2021) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
108. Surden, supra note 18.
109. Id. at 1610.
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from particular behaviors. 110 Sometimes society “rel[ies] upon a non-legal
constraint mechanism to reliably prohibit unwanted behavior in the place of and
as a substitute for an explicit law.” 111
Surden distinguishes between intentional structural constraints, such as
fences or cryptography, 112 and what he calls “latent structural constraints” or
“the current technological or physical state of the world.” 113 He points to
several activities that at some point were “so costly in terms of resources and
effort as to render them effectively impossible to carry out on a widespread
basis.” 114 His examples of latent structural constraints include DNA
sequencing, searching for personal information in paper court records, and
copying copyrighted works (before photocopying machines, PCs, and the
internet). 115
Surden’s use of the move is normative. He claims that societal reliance on
latent (as opposed to intentional) structural constraints can indicate the implicit
protection of a “constraint-right.” 116 When the emergence of new technologies
threatens to remove such constraints, Surden suggests that policymakers
should replace nonlegal constraints with legal constraints, recreating structural
constraints through law. 117 Understanding technological change as a shift in
the imagined regulatory scene in this way allows Surden to argue that these are
not new legal rights but, rather, “the continuation of a previously existing right.” 118
110. Id. at 1606 n.7 (“This focus of this Essay is the Hohfeldian negative right—the duty
to refrain from a particular behavior . . . .”).
111. Id. at 1607.
112. Id. at 1612.
113. Id. at 1613.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1613, 1620.
116. Id. at 1607.
117. Id. at 1609 (“[P]olicymakers should closely examine the implicit privacy interests . . .
to expressly determine whether they merit explicit governance by another regulatory device.”);
see also id. at 1611–12 (“[N]on-legal constraint mechanisms may give rise to relationships
between constraints and behaviors that are, in many respects, functionally equivalent to those
relationships which give rise to legal rights. In other words, since certain legal rights—negative
individual rights—are defined by reference to behaviors that are constrained, it is analytically
useful to conceive of the relationship between non-legal constraints and the behaviors that
they constrain as creating analogues to legal interests. To the extent that society relies upon a
non-legal constraint, such as structure, to inhibit behavior or reliably protect a ‘right’ in place of
or as a substitute for a legal constraint that would have had to have been enacted to create an
explicit legal right, the constraint-rights framework suggests that policymakers should
expressly query whether a corresponding rights-like relationship—a constraint-right—has
been established.”).
118. Id. at 1619 (“Such a distinction becomes important in the public policy debate over
protecting privacy interests where the creation of a new privacy right may prove politically
more difficult than the protection of an existing right.”).
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However, Surden leaves space for policymakers to choose not to preserve a
constraint in service of a particular goal.
Orin Kerr is more explicitly normative in his claim that the policy balance
struck in the pretechnological imagined regulatory scene is the right one. 119 In
An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, Kerr proposes that
courts begin by conceptualizing a balance of police power struck under “the
Fourth Amendment at Year Zero, an imaginary time before the introduction
of tools both to commit crimes and to catch wrongdoers.” 120 This is Kerr’s
imagined regulatory scene, policing in the time before the development of
information technologies. 121
Kerr explains that changes in technology’s social use can upset the policy
balance struck in this imagined scene—specifically, the balance of police
power versus individual freedom. 122 According to Kerr,
New tools threaten the privacy/security balance because they enable
both cops and robbers to accomplish tasks they couldn’t before, or
else to do old tasks more easily or cheaply than before. For criminals
trying to commit crimes, new tools mean new ways to commit
offenses more easily and more cheaply, or with less risk of being
caught than before. . . . Of course, the police use new tools, too. .
. . [T]he new tools can expand government power by letting the
government collect more information more easily than before. 123

Not every technological change will result in an upset of the policy balance.
But when the social use of new technology does upset the balance by
expanding police power, according to Kerr, judges must and do restore it. 124
Kerr calls this approach to Fourth Amendment analysis “equilibriumadjustment.” 125
Laura Donohue’s work shows that not everyone shares the same idea of
the status quo ante. That is, Kerr’s imagined scene at Year Zero affords the
police significant power and discretion, especially when surveillance occurs in

119. Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 476, 484 (2011).
120. Id. at 482.
121. Id. at 483 (“Year Zero represents an imaginary time, a sort of beginning of the
universe for criminal investigations. It is a fiction, of course.”).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 486.
124. Id. at 487 (“[J]udges adjust Fourth Amendment protection to restore the preexisting
level of police power.”).
125. Id.
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public. 126 Kerr imagines a status quo ante where the rule is, if you’re in public,
there is no privacy. Donohue by contrast focuses on previous environmental
constraints on police power even in public spaces. 127 That is, she focuses on
the tools the police did not have in the past and, consequently, their inability
to cheaply and readily track suspects in public. The gap between Kerr’s and
Donohue’s understandings of desirable Fourth Amendment doctrine
demonstrates that just because two different scholars both deploy the move
does not mean they will arrive at the same normative or doctrinal endpoints.
2. Architectural Changes as Affordances
Architectural changes to the imagined regulatory scene may do more than
remove constraints on bad actors or decrease the costs of bad behavior. They
also alter the affordances of the imagined environment, including for people
that the legal system may want to protect. As danah boyd writes:
The design and architecture of environments enable certain types of
interaction to occur. Round tables with chairs make chatting with
someone easier than classroom-style seating. Even though students
can twist around and talk to the person behind them, a typical
classroom is designed to encourage everyone to face the teacher. The
particular properties or characteristics of an environment can be
understood as affordances because they make possible—and, in some
cases, are used to encourage—certain types of practices, even if they
do not determine what practices will unfold. Understanding the
affordances of a particular technology or space is important because
it sheds light on what people can leverage or resist in achieving their
goals. 128

boyd’s initial imagined regulatory scene is a pretechnological physical public
space. She writes that the environments shaped by social media differ from
physical public spaces in four key ways: persistence, visibility, spreadability,
and searchability. 129 That is, online content persists or endures longer than
offline interactions; online content is visible to a larger audience, that is “public

126. Laura Donohue, The Fourth Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURVEY
AM. L. 533, 2017, n. 35 (noting that “Orin Kerr, in his postulation of the equilibrium theory
of the Fourth Amendment, lists as his first rule of the status quo in rule zero: ‘[T]he police are
always free to watch suspects in public’ ”).
127. Id. at 558 (“[A]s the collection and analysis of information requires fewer and fewer
resources, constraints that previously played a key role in protecting privacy are dropping
away.”)
128. DANAH BOYD, IT’S COMPLICATED: THE SOCIAL LIVES OF NETWORKED TEENS 10–
11 (2014).
129. Id. Id. at 12.

KAMINSKI_FINALPROOF_07-20-22 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

TECHNOLOGICAL “DISRUPTION”

9/15/2022 9:43 AM

909

by default, [or] private through effort”; 130 consumers can more readily share
online content; and searching for and finding online content is comparably
easy. These features are not just removals of constraints on bad actors, as
discussed by Surden, Kerr, and Donohue. They allow social media users, good
and bad, to use them as capabilities—they afford.
These affordances can enable bad actors, to be clear. For example, Mary
Anne Franks claims that anonymity, amplification, permanence, and publicity
all “exacerbate the impact of harassment” online. 131 In particular, Franks’s
notion of “amplification” and boyd’s notion of “spreadability” sound in similar
notes to the constraints conversation above: they identify a feature of the
online environment that makes it easier to harass someone than in the offline
physical space—that is, that removes a structural constraint on bad actors.
But a closer reading of Franks shows something else at work. Franks is
concerned not just with changes that make it easier for a bad actor to do
something bad. She is also concerned with changes that prevent a rights-holder
from protecting her rights through doing something good. That is, Franks
believes online anonymity makes it “difficult if not impossible for the targets
[of harassment online] to engage in self-help” that would have been possible
offline. 132 Offline, a woman could track and shame her harasser. Online, that
sort of self-help is much harder.
Franks points, for example, to the kind of context collapse online spaces
enable. 133 Where in offline spaces the target of harassment could prevent
harassment that occurs on the street from impacting her experience in the
workplace, in online spaces she no longer has that kind of control. The
changed affordances of the online environment alter her capabilities as much
as they alter the capabilities of, or constraints on, her harassers.
The affordances-focused take on the imagined regulatory scene thus
emphasizes not just constraints on bad behavior; it also focuses on what good
actors rely on and use. For example, Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic Stutzman
write about the “major structural differences in online and off-line
communication,” drawing on boyd’s and Rob Kling’s works, among others. 134
Hartzog and Stutzman observe that “[w]e utilize a range of cues and physical
structures to figure out how we should present ourselves. For example, our
130. Id. at 12.
131. Mary Anne Franks, Unwilling Avatars: Idealism and Discrimination in Cyberspace, 20
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 224, 255–56 (2011).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 10 (2013).
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understanding of the private nature of a conversation is moderated by the
presence of walls and doors.” 135 Individuals analogously use features of the
online environment to establish “private” environments or actively make it
difficult for others to find information. 136
For example, Hartzog and Stutzman argue that courts are mistaken in
viewing online privacy through a private-public dichotomy. 137 They identify
that courts in the predigital era recognized a privacy interest in documents that
were not entirely secret but were “practically obscure”—that is, where
information “was technically available to the public, but could only be found
by spending a burdensome and unrealistic amount of time and effort in
obtaining it.” 138 That is, courts recognized that a person with privacy rights
could rely on the affordances of paper documents in protecting her privacy.
Hartzog and Stutzman suggest that courts today should similarly recognize
privacy interests when individuals use features of the online environment to
obscure information online. 139
This brings us back to Reidenberg’s observation that technology and its
design can be used to address problems, not just create them. In follow-on
work, Hartzog and Stutzman propose ways of implementing “obscurity by
design” by deploying technologies individuals can use to actively foster
obscurity in the online environment just as they once had in the offline
world. 140 That is, understanding that the structure of the imagined regulatory
scene online is different than offline, they propose affording analogous
structures in the online environment so individuals can continue identity
management the way they once did (and largely continue to do) offline. 141

135. Id. at 7–8.
136. Id. at 16 (“[I]ndividuals exert control over the information they disclose by limiting
the audience of the disclosure, by bounding the meaning of the disclosure, and by reflexively
adapting the disclosure to the site. In social media, where anonymity often violates social
norms or site terms, individuals strategically develop techniques that effectively produce
obscurity in disclosure. This is not to say that established techniques of privacy management
are invalid in these domains, but rather that new techniques that are contextually appropriate
emerge so individuals can maintain their expectation of privacy and obscurity.”).
137. Id. at 17, 20.
138. Id. at 21.
139. Id. at 32.
140. Woodrow Hartzog & Frederic Stutzman, Obscurity by Design, 88 WASH. L. REV. 385,
402–07 (2013) (recognizing “smart hyperlinks,” privacy settings, search blockers, deidentifying tools, passwords, and encryption as technologies that could implement “obscurity
by design”).
141. Hartzog went on to write a book on the role of technological design in both deceiving
internet users about the nature of the online environment and enabling active identity
management. See HARTZOG, supra note 29.
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Sociotechnical change can, in summary, do more than remove architectural
constraints on bad actors. It can alter the imagined regulatory scene such that
the tools a person once had—whether physical or social—are significantly
changed or no longer there at all. Legislators, regulators, and judges then make
decisions as to whether to restore lost affordances, require notice of changed
affordances, or constrain affordances through regulation of design.
3. Architectural Changes as Mediation or Channeling
References to architectural changes in the imagined regulatory scene can
often sound in law and economics, with technological changes and their social
uses characterized as a decrease in transaction costs that formerly thwarted bad
actors. 142 But not all structural changes to the imagined regulatory scene are
significant because they increase or decrease transaction costs for some
imaginary rational actor. 143 The discussion of affordances evidences this;
sometimes the architectural change constitutes a new tool or feature that can
alter behavioral patterns by channeling them, or removes an existing tool, or
triggers miscalibrated behavior by giving off a misleading signal that an
environment is other than what it is.
More recently, the law-and-technology literature has turned to the darker
side of technological design, focusing on the way in which technology mediates
and channels our behavior in ways that go even further than affordances, to
the core of our understandings of the self. 144 Take, for example, Ryan Calo’s
142. See Justin Hurwitz, The Technological Problem of Social Cost: TPRC Draft 1 (Mar.
31,
2016)
(unpublished
manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2757358 (“[T]echnological change can affect transaction costs, and
therefore the law, in predictable ways.”); JUSTIN “GUS” HURWITZ & GEOFFREY A. MANNE,
CLASSICAL LIBERALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 13 (2019),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3384300 (“[N]ew technology is often
developed and adopted precisely because of its effects on transaction costs. But any change in
the incidence or level of transaction costs can significantly alter the optimal initial assignment
of rights to maximize the likelihood of voluntary exchange. This means that technology may
disrupt the structure of the legal institutions necessary to facilitate efficient, welfare-enhancing
outcomes.”).
143. Cohen, supra note 15, at 1908 (“The self has no autonomous, precultural core, nor
could it, because we are born and remain situated within social and cultural contexts. And
privacy is not a fixed condition, nor could it be, because the individual’s relationship to social
and cultural contexts is dynamic. These realities do not weaken the case for privacy; they
strengthen it. But the nature and importance of privacy can be understood only in relation to
a very different vision of the self and of the self-society connection.”).
144. Cohen refers to this as “modulation.” See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1912 (“Citizens
within modulated democracies—citizens who are subject to pervasively distributed
surveillance and modulation by powerful commercial and political interests—increasingly will
lack the ability to form and pursue meaningful agendas for human flourishing.”).
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work Digital Market Manipulation. 145 Calo explains that the change to the
imagined regulatory scene is that a person now acts through technology. That
is, “[t]he consumer of the future is a mediated consumer—she approaches the
marketplace through technology designed by someone else.” 146 The mediated
consumer is not necessarily constrained by technological architecture, nor does
she use technological architecture’s affordances; she is channeled through
them.
This mediation has consequences. Calo claims that by creating a detailed
record of consumer behavior that firms use in their design of consumer
interfaces, mediation allows for the mass production of cognitive biases and
persuasion of a kind previously unknown. 147 That is, “[a] firm with the
resources and inclination will be in a position to surface and exploit how
consumers tend to deviate from rational decisionmaking on a previously
unimaginable scale. Thus, firms will increasingly be in the position to create
suckers, rather than waiting for one to be born.” 148
Others have more recently focused on the creation of “dark patterns” and
other forms of deliberate online manipulation in the marketplace and
elsewhere. 149 Julie Cohen discusses mediation in an even more profoundly
disrupting sense. For Cohen, we are not just consumers in a marketplace where
the mediators actively exploit our inefficiencies or biases. We are by nature
socially constructed, and today’s information technologies are designed to
affect how we socially construct ourselves. 150
In What Privacy is For, Cohen writes:
Like the other artifacts that we use in our daily lives, networked
information technologies mediate our relationship to the world
around us. Processes of mediation are partly behavioral. The
particular design features of our artifacts make some activities seem
easier and more natural and others more difficult, and these implicit
behavioral templates, or affordances, encourage us to behave in
certain ways rather than others. But processes of mediation are also
conceptual and heuristic. Our artifacts organize the world for us,

145. Calo, supra note 15.
146. Id. at 1002.
147. Id. at 1006.
148. Id. at 1018.
149. See Luguri & Strahilevitz, supra note 105; Daniel Susser, Beate Roessler & Helen
Nissenbaum, Online Manipulation: Hidden Influences in a Digital World, 4 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 1,
26 (2019).
150. See supra note 143 and accompanying quote.
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subtly shaping the ways that we make sense of it. Over time we come
to perceive the world through the lenses that our artifacts create. 151

We are not just constrained or released from constraints by new technologies.
We become what they channel us into being. The “person” in the diagrams
pages ago isn’t some static, separate actor. She is embedded in and designed
by technology and its social use as much as she acts upon or is acted upon by
it.
V.

CONCLUSION

Writing over twenty years ago, Joel Reidenberg identified that technology
could change the regulatory environment in ways lawmakers did not yet
understand. Technology, too, could itself be deployed to mitigate these
changes. Websites and browsers could be designed differently, and law could
play a role in that change.
This Article has identified a particular vein of law and technology
scholarship in which these observations have played out and developed. Many
legal scholars look at technology and the law by imagining a before-and-after:
a time before a technology is in use and a time after its use has taken hold.
Technological changes to the imagined regulatory scene often affect the
architecture of the imagined regulatory environment. Scholars identify these
architectural changes and use them to make normative arguments—to keep
the law as it is or to change it. Just as with a complete shift in regulatory scene,
these changes can shift us up into conversations about, not just the “how” and
“what” of law, but also the “why.” I imagine that, for many of us, this is what
makes the field of law and technology worthwhile.

151. Cohen, supra note 15, at 1912–13.
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